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Abstract 
We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are 
repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dy­
namic setting, and discuss how it differs from efficiency in centralized static setting. We 
then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and 
sellers bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, 
characterizing the possible allocation rules which result as the extensive game form is var­
ied. We are particularly concerned with the impact of making trade voluntary: imposing 
individual rationality on and off the equilibrium path. No buyer or seller consumates an 
agreement which leaves them worse off than the discounted expected value of their fu­
ture rematching in the market. Finally, we compare and contrast the efficient allocations 
with those that could ever arise as the equlibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper is part of a broad research agenda to understand how markets should be 
designed ,  and the extent to which efficient outcomes can be acheived. In particular, this 
paper is motivated by our interest in understanding the process of trade in markets that 
are limited to decentralized bilateral trading. To this end, we employ a simple model 
of matching and search with an infinity of buyers and sellers, where search costs are 
represented by a delay between random rematchings. Each buyer has a valuation for 
one (indivisible) unit of a good, and each seller is endowed with one unit and also has a 
valuation. There is a known distribution of seller and buyer valuations. Trade occurs in 
discrete periods. In the first period, buyers and sellers are randomly matched into pairs . 
Each pair then plays a bargaining game that either results in a trade at some price, or no 
trade. If a buyer-seller match does not result in a trade, then each is randomly rematched 
-yvith a new potential trading partner in the next period. There is discounting between 
periods. Iil this model we characterize the efficient allocations and study the allocations 
that are achievable via various bargaining procedures. 
This paper departs from past work in this area, by approaching the problem from 
the implementation theory perspective. On the one hand, consistent with much of the 
previous literature on decentralized bilateral trade, the matching and search technology 
described above is taken as given. But contrary to past work on decentralized bilateral 
trade, we do not treat the rules of trade as fixed a priori. That is , our objective is not to 
study properties of equilibira under some specific game form according to which bilateral 
trade is governed (say, the Rubinstein bargaining game, or the Nash bargaining solution) , 
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but rather to ask instead the implementation question: what allocation rules can be 
implemented as unique equilirium outcome of some finite extensive form bargaining game 
of perfect information? We first characterize the set of efficient allocation rules in this 
environment, and then characterize the set of all allocation rules that can be implemented 
by some bargaining game. Using the conditions for implementability, we show that there 
exist robust distributions of buyer and seller valuations in which efficient allocations 
cannot be  implemented by any bargaining game, and in fact are not even attainable as 
an equilibrium of any bargaining game. 
The characterization of efficient allocations is nontrivial. Given that trading is con­
strained to occur only between matched buyers and sellers, and that there are search 
costs (i .e .  time is valuable) , there are generally distortions that must occur relative to 
traditional static efficiency. If one thinks of a simple supply and demand curve (here, 
representing seller and buyers' reservation values) , the static efficient solution would be 
to have all buyers with values above the competitive equilibrium price trade with all 
sellers whose values are below that price. In the setting examined here, that may not be 
possible as these buyers and sellers may not be matched. If a very low valuation seller 
is matched with a buyer whose valuation is slightly below the equilibrium price should a 
trade be enacted? Given that there is value to the time before a rematching can occur, 
and that the rematching might also result in a similar match, the answer is possibly yes. 
We show that the dynamically efficient allocations are uniquely determined (up to sets 
of measure zero) , and we fully characterize such allocations and establish a number of 
their properties. 
As mentioned above, once we have a characterization of efficient allocation rules, we 
need to check on the implementability of those rules. To do so, we first need to specify the 
class of all bargaining mechanisms that we allow. We consider bargaining mechanisms 
which are finite-length extensive game forms of perfect information. Also, the game form 
i("l augmented by appending to each terminal node (except no trade terminal nodes) a 
'signature move for both the buyer and the seller. Both signatures are needed, or the 
mechanism results in no trade for that match. The role of the signatures is to ensure 
that trade is voluntary, or respects individual rationality constraints. It is assumed that 
the the buyer and seller in the match have complete information about each others' 
valuations, so the solution concept wr employ is backward induction. If anything, this 
informational assumption should make it easier to implement the efficient allocations. 
We show first that in very special environments (homogeneous seller valuations and 
no search costs) the efficient allocation rule is implemented by the bargaining game 
whereby for any buyer-seller match , the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the 
buyer. To establish implementability i n  more general environments, we first establish 
general conditions for implementabilit�·. Given a simple set of necessary conditions, we 
provide a robust example showing that if seller valuations are not identical, then efficient 
allocations are not implementable, even if there is no discounting. We close with a 
characterization of implementable allocation rules. 
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2 Relation to the Literature 
Because this paper bridges several different areas, we discuss separately how it fits in 
with previous work in two broad themes: competitive bargaining and implementation. 
Basically, what we are doing here is layering the implementation question on to a standard 
model of search and competitive bargaining. Thus, our work relates to both of these areas. 
Relation to the Competitive Bargaining Literature 
The underlying model that we study involves a combination of matching, bargaining, 
search and rematching over a sequence of trading periods. As such, it is useful for 
studying pure exchange economies from a non-cooperative, game-theoretic perspective. 
Past work in the area 1, has typically assumed both the technological features underlying 
the matching and search technologies and also has assumed the formal rules according 
to which bargaining between paired agents is required to follow. It is this latter set of 
assumptions that marks the first key difference between what we are doing and what has 
been done before. While the bargaining rules usually are modeled as a specific process 
of offers and counteroffers such as one based on Rubinstein (1982) and Stahl ( 1972) , we 
explicitly do not assume a particular game form for the bargaining process. Rather, we 
are trying to identify the set of allocation rules (Walrasian or otherwise) that can be 
achieved as unique Nash equilibrium outcomes of some bargaining mechanism. 
The second difference between this paper and earlier work is that we do not focus on 
the question of the equivalence between Walrasian and competitive bargaining outcomes 
when market frictions are small. In fact , we are not particularly interested in the case 
of frictionless markets per se, but focus instead on the properties of markets in which 
frictions exist, despite the large numbers of traders. To this end, we characterize dynam­
ically efficient allocation rules subject to the matching constraints, and show how these 
differ in systematic and interesting ways from competitive allocations. The study of allo­
cation rules generated by matching processes, combined with noncooperative competitive 
bargaining is the subject of several recent papers, including Lu and McAfee ( 1995) and 
Peters (1995) . Related work is also underway by Shimer and Smith (1996) , who do not 
investigate the role of the bargaining game or other implementation questions, but in­
stead address issues efficient sorting subject to the constraints of the matching process, 
where agreements (when reached) are assumed to be governed by the Nash bargaining 
solution.  
1 By now the collection of papers in this area is too large to summarize exhaustively. The most closely 
related papers include Gale (1986ab), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Binmore and Herrero (1988) ,  
and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991) which follow in the footsteps of the early work on search and 
matching by Butters (1980), Mortensen (1982), Diamond (1982) and others. The bulk of this work is 
interested in identifying conditions under which game-theoretic equilibria in these decentralized matching 
and bilateral bargaining institutions will approximate Walrasian allocations when the frictions (seach 
costs, discount factors, etc.) become infinitesimal. We lump all these together under the general heading 
of "competitive bargaining" .  
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Relation to the Implementation Literature 
This paper is also related to the extensive implementation literature which studies the 
classes of allocation rules that can be acheived when self-interested individuals interact 
through some mechanism. This approach models mechanisms as game forms and obtains 
general characterizations of what can be acheived by some mechanism in various specified 
. classes of game forms, when behavior is modeled according to a variety of game theoretic 
solution concepts. 
This theory can be useful from at least two perspectives: First, if one takes a de­
signer's normative point of view it helps one identify the set of allocation rules that can 
be decentralized and provides recipes for that decentralization. Second, even if one takes 
a more positive point of view where one is not choosing the mechanism, but rather is 
interested in knowing the properties of allocation rules that result the outcome of some 
interaction between individuals. The second perspective puts more weight on identify­
ing necessary conditions for implementation, while the first perspective puts additional 
emphasis on sufficiency conditions. 
Although the necessary conditions that come out of this literature must be taken 
seriously, there is somewhat less consensus about the practicality of the many of the 
sufficiency results, where very general and abstract mechanisms are constructed in order 
to demonstrate that a certain class of allocation rules can be implemented. There are 
two bases on which the canonical mechanisms have been criticized. The first is purely 
subjective and is simply that the mechanisms seem "unnatural" in the sense that they 
do not closely resembling commonly used institutions or have seemingly artificial parts 
of the message space such as the annoucement of preference profiles and the reporting 
of integers. There is also a basis for criticizing mechanisms on specific properties that 
they sometimes fail to posess. For instance, applying a theorem by Maskin (1977) tells 
µs that a constrained version of the Walrasian correspondence is Nash implementable 
when there are three or more agents. But this result places no axiomatic constraints of 
the nature of the mechanism. One can also ask if the same result will hold if the mecha­
nism is required. to have a continuous and balanced outcome function (e.g. , Postlewaite 
and Wettstein ( 1989)) ;  or if the message space of the mechanism is constrained to be 
simple in some way (e.g. , Dutta, Sen , and Vohra ( 1993) , Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato 
(1993) , and Sjostrom (1995) ) .  One might also wish to require properties that are neces­
sary for a solution concept to always be well-defined on various parts of the mechanism 
(the boundedness condition relating to eliminating dominated strategies, and the best 
response condition relating to Nash equilibrium in Jackson (1992) and Jackson, Palfrey 
and Srivastava ( 1994) ) .  A related critique (Jackson (1992) and Abreu and Matsushima 
(1992) ) is that (until recently) research in implementation has ignored mixed strategies . 
In this paper, we want to avoid the problems of artificiality as well as the problems 
inherent in mechanisms for which behavior is not always well-defined relative to the 
solution concept. In addition, we wish to begin to remedy two other shortcomings to the 
existing work in implementation theory. 
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First, we wish to avoid the use of implausible threats, used either to enforce certain 
actions in equilibrium, or to prevent certain strategy profiles from being "undesirable" 
equilibria. An extreme example of such a threat (which appears often in sufficiency 
constructions) is for the planner to destroy the all or part of the social endowment, if a 
particular out-of-equilibrium message profile is announced. The basic problems with this 
is that such outcomes may not be credible or enforceable and agents should anticipate 
this when deciding on strategies. Such mechanisms seem particularly far-fetched in cases 
where the players have inherent property rights (such as an initial endowment or outside 
option) that provide a lower bound of the utility the agent can expect in the mechanism, 
for all message profiles. In our model, because the buyer and seller in a match will be 
rematched in the next period, should they fail to agree to exchange, this places a natural 
type of "individual rationality" constraint on the process: no buyer or seller should 
consumate an agreement which leaves them worse off than the discounted expected value 
of their future rematching in the market. This gives us a natural notion of what we call 
voluntary implementation. 
Voluntary implementation is related to problems of renegotiation-proofness and indi­
vidual rationality, both of which have been considered to a limited extent in implemen­
tation theory. Maskin and Moore (1988) investigated "renegotiation-proof implementa­
tion" , where any possible outcome of the mechanism that specifies a Pareto dominated 
allocation is replaced by a Pareto efficient allocation rule according to an exogenously 
specified renegotiation function. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992) carried this further, by 
examining renegotiation-proof implementation in a pairwise bargaining setting where the 
renegotiation was explicitly modeled, showing that the question depends in important 
ways on the type of renegotiation process. Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) impose an 
individual rationality constraint, which takes the form as an "opt-out" for each player. 
In this paper, individual rationality is a bit more. Specifically, voluntary implementa­
tion takes the form of an endogenous individual rationality constraint, since individual 
.rationality is determined by the value of future rematching, which in turn depends on the bargaining mechanism itself. 
A more distantly related (but similarly motivated) problem in implementation theory 
is "credibility" , or the ability of the planner to commit to off-equilibrium-path outcomes 
that are known to be undesirable , in order to implement desirable outcomes on the 
equilibrium path. Chakravorti, Corchon , and Vlilkie (1992) investigate this, and Baliga, 
Corchon, and Sjostrom (1995) and Baliga and Sjostrom (1995) go further, by including 
the planner as a player in the mechanism. In our work, the problem of credibility is 
finessed by the voluntary nature of the transaction. 
The second issue where we depart from past work in implementation theory is to study 
dynamic allocation rules. Previously, the implementation problem has almost without 
exception been cast in a static setting where the set of agents interacting is not changing 
with time. 
The importance of intertemporal tradeoffs is critical since many problems that economists 
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are interested in, such as bargaining, investment, growth, repeated interactions, and so 
forth, are dynamic. Unfortunately, implementation theory has little to contribute to 
questions of mechanism design in this large arena. Extensive form games have been ex­
amined, but only in the context of using them to implement static allocations.2 Finally, 
we wish to emphasize that the implementation in this paper is somewhat stronger than 
just implementation by subgame perfect equilbrium. Our implementation results are 
for mechanisms that are constructed as games of perfect information, so our concept of 
equilibrium is actually "backward induction" (Herrero and Srivastava (1992)) ,  which is 
a stronger notion of implementatfon than subgame perfection. 
Summarizing our contributions relative to the implementation literature :  using a com­
petitive bargaining model with rematching, we are able to characterize implementability 
in a dynamic environment, without imposing implausible threats, and without employ­
ing artificial or suspicious features to the implementing mechanism. Thus, we obtain a 
characterization of what is implementable is this class of dynamic allocation problems, 
without resorting to the usually cumbersome methods of proof in implementation theory. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model and definitions are pre­
sented in Section 3. Dynamically efficient allocation rules are characterized in Section 4. 
Section 5 establishes two simple necessary conditions for voluntary implementation of a 
dyanamic allocation rule. Section 6 presents a robust example that demonstrates the 
general non-implementability of dynamically efficient allocation rules. Section 7 presents 
a full characterization of dynamic allocation rules that can be voluntarily implemented. 
Section 8 contains some concluding remarks. 
3 Definitions 
The Economy 
There are two goods. One good is indivisible and the other is divisible. Sellers are 
endowed with one- unit of the indivisible good, and buyers are endowed with one unit of 
the divisible (numeraire) good. 
Preferences 
Agents' preferences are are characterized by a reservation value of the indivisible good, 
v E [O, l]. There are a finite number of dates, t E {1 ,  . . . , T}, at which trade can take 
place, and a common discount parameter 8 E [O, l]. A seller with reservation value s 
who sells her indivisible good for p units of the numeraire good at time t receives utility 
ot(p - s) , and a buyer with reservation value b who buys a unit of the indivisible good 
for p units of the numeraire good at time t receives utility ot(b-p). An agent who never 
trades receives utility 0 .  
2Two recent exceptions are Kalai and Ledyard (1995) and Brusco and Jackson (1996) .  
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Distributions of Values 
Initially, there is a continuum buyers and of sellers. Information concerning the 
reservation values of the agents remaining in the economy at the beginning of a time 
t E { 1, . . . , T} is summarized by the following functions. 
Bt(b) - the mass of buyers at time t with value no more than b . .  
St (s) - the mass of sellers at time t with value no more than s. 
These are not cumulative distribution functions, since, for instance, it may be that 
St( l) # 1. The corresponding distribution functions (for St(l) > 0 and Bt(l) > 0) are 
�:f�� and �:f��. The initial mass of buyers and sellers is the same, B1 (1) = 81 (1), so it 
will always be true that Bt(l) = St(l) ,  for all t. This is without loss of generality, since 
we can model other cases by adding buyers or sellers who should never trade.3 
We assume that at least one of the two distributions is atomless. Specifically, we 
will assume that the initial distribution of buyers, B1 , is continuous and increasing at all 
b > 0 .  This rules out masses of buyers with identical valuations and assures that there 
are buyers with values in an any open subinterval of [0 ,1] . This assumption simplifies the 
analysis in that we do not have to worry about rationing agents with the same valuation, 
or randomizing. The one exception is that we allow for the possibility of a mass of buyers 
at b = 0 .  
Pairwise Matching 
At the beginning of each period, the remaining buyers and sellers who have not yet 
traded are.pairwis� matched with each other. The matching is described by a probability 
measure µt on [O, 1]2 where for any measurable At c [O, 1]2 
(A)_ ( ( ( dB t (b) ) dSt(s) µt t 
- Js Jb:(s , b)EAt B t (l) St (l) 
. 
The distribution over values that any specific seller with valuation s will be matched with 
at time t is dffi(W. Similarly, the distribution over values that any specific buyer with 
valuation b will be matched with at time t is d�1/t/. 
Remarks on the Matching. 
Note that there is generally a measurability problem associated with a law of large 
numbers over a continuum of i .i .d. random variables (see Judd ( 1985) and Feldman and 
Gilles ( 1985)) . Our random variables (the buyer matched to a given seller) are naturally 
3For instance, B1 (1) > S1 (1), is handled by adding sellers withs= 1. 
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not i.i .d . ,  as no two sellers are ever matched to the same buyer; however, there still remain 
problems with finding a foundation for the matching process described above.4 
For the case where the distributions are step functions (i.e . ,  buyers' and sellers' val­
uations only take on a finite number of values) we can describe a matching process with 
the above specified properties, as follows. Consider a given valuation of the sellers and 
suppose that there is a mass m: of sellers with this valuation. Select a subset of the 
buyers with total mass m: so that the distribution of buyer valuations in this subset is 
�:f��. Next , arrange these buyers around the edge of a wheel (in a measurable way) ' and 
the sellers around the outside of the wheel. Finally, "spin" the wheel and match up the 
sellers and buyers who are lined up when the wheel stops. 
The difficulty with trying to extend the above described process to a situation where, 
for instance, the buyers values span a continuum is now easily seen. For any v it must 
be that there is a measurable subset of buyers with mass St( v) and with distribution of 
valuations ;:(�) . Starting with a set with mass Bt(l)  > St(v) , it is not always possible to 
find a measurable subset (with mass St(v)) which preserves the original distribution of 
valuations. This can be shown along the same lines as Proposition 1 in Feldman and Gilles 
(1985) . To get the rough intuition behind this, one can think of a measurable function 
(the one indicating which buyers have been matched) as being 'almost' continuous. It 
is not possible to be almost continuous and still select a given proportion from every 
interval of buyers. 
There are ways around the difficulty discussed above that would suit our purposes. 
One is to notice that we can find a matching process that comes arbitrarily close to fitting 
the above description. Alternatively, we could work with step function distributions 
where one can exactly satisfy the representation and arbitrarily approximate the limiting 
distribution. We choose to work directly at the limit distributions and to note that 
we can come arbitrarily close to finding a matching process that formally justifies the 
assumed one. (See Al-Najjar (1996) for more discussion of this. )  The reason for doing 
this, rather than working with step functions, is that it slightly simplifies the analysis of 
efficient allocations. 
Allocation Rules 
To describe allocations, we need to describe which buyers and sellers will trade at each 
time, and what price will be paid ( i .e. , what transfer is made) . We restrict our attention to 
allocation rules which depend only on the time and on the buyers' and sellers' valuations 
(but not their names) . This restriction reflects our interest in anonymous processes and 
simplifies our notation without any real loss of generality under our assumptions.5 
4See McClennan and Sonnenschein (1991) for some additional discussion in the context of a model 
that has the same kind of measurability problem. 
5The trades which are made at a time t could be allowed to depend on the history of trades made up 
until that point, and a buyer or sellers' name rather than just their value . However , given the continuum 
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A trading rule is a collection, A= (A1, . . .  , AT) ,  of measurable �ubsets At of [O , 1] x 
[O , 1] . A pair (s , b) E At indicates that any seller with valuation s and buyer with 
valuation b who are matched at time t should trade. 
A price rule is a collection of measurable functions p = ( P1 , . . .  , PT ) , where Pt : At ---+ 
[O , l] . A price rule indicates that if a buyer and seller trade then the buyer transfers 
Pt (s ,  b) units of the divisible good to the seller. 
An allocation rule consists of a trading rule and a price rule. 
Cutoff Rules 
One type of trading rule that will play an important role in our results is a cutoff 
rule. This is a rule such that the set of buyers who trade with any given seller form an 
upper interval of the set of buyer types, and the set of sellers who trade with a given 
buyer form a lower interval of the set of seller types. More formally, A is a cutoff rule if 
for all t and s ,6 
(i) either {bi(s, b) E At} = {b E [O , l]lb 2: b'} or {bi(s , b) E At} = {b E [O , l]lb > b'} 
for some b' E [O, 1] , and 
(ii) {bi(s , b) E At} C {bi(s' , b) E At} whenever s > s' . 
In many cases i t  will not matter whether the inequalities in (i) are weak or  strict (see 
the definition of equivalence below) , and we represent a cutoff rule by functions f3t(s) 
(corresponding to b' in ( i)) . 
Evolution of Distributions over Values 
Any trading rule A and initial distributions 51 and B1 induce 52, . . . , ST and B2, . . . , BT , 
according to the !Ilatching process. The resulting distributions are defined recursively 
by: 
and 
1 (1 dBt(b) ) St+1 (v) = St (v) - B ( ) dSt(s) s::;v b:(s,b)EAt t 1 
1 (1 dSt(s) ) Bt+1 (v) = Bt (v) - S (l) dBt (b) . b::;v s:(s,b)EAt t 
(1 ) 
(2)  
model and the properties of the matching process, the history will be  known as  a function oft (up to 
sets of measure 0) . Also, there will not be any positive mass of matched agents with the same pair of 
valuations, so knowing the agents' names is unnecessary. 
6The definition can equivalently be stated from the buyer's perspective. 
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Equivalence of Trading and Allocation Rules 
Given the continuum of agents, we define an equivalence over allocation rules that 
differ only on sets of measure 0. 
The trading rules A and A are equivalent if for each t, µt(At n At) = µt(At U At) ,  
where µt is the measure defined in (0) induced by A according to ( 1 ) and (2) .7 
The allocation rules (A, p) and (A,p) are equivalent if A and A are equivalent and 
for each t ,  µt( { (s , b) E AtlP(s , b) # p(s , b)}) = 0. 
Expected Utility 
The expected utility uf ( s; A, p) of a seller with valuation s under an allocation rule 
(A, p) at time t conditional on not having traded yet is given by 
s ( ) � 8r-t ( r- 1 [ 1 dBi(b)]) (1 ( ( ) ) dBr(b)) ut s;A, p = L; IIi=t 1 - . . B·(l) . Pr s , b - s B (l) . r=t · b.(s,b)EA, i b.(s,b)EAT 7 
Similarly, the expression for the expected utility ub(b, A, p) of a buyer with valuation b 
under an allocation rule (A, p) is given by 
Reservation Prices 
It will often be useful to work with the reservation prices, p:( s; A, p) and .PHb; A, p) , 
induced by an allocation rule. The reservation price at time t is simply the price at which 
an indivdual wo.uld be indifferent between trading and not trading at time t. These follow 
immediately from above: 
p:(s; A , p) - s = 8uf+1 (s; A, p) , t = 1 ,  · · · ,  T- l 
b - p� ( b; A, p) = 8u�+ 1 ( b; A, p) , t = 1 ,  . .  · , T - 1 
pT(s; A, p) = s 
p�(b; A, p) = b. 
When an allocation rule is fixed , we may simply write u:(s) and pf(s) . 
7Notice that in this case that the measure fit induced by At will coincide with µt. 
10 
Dynamic Efficiency 
We say that a trading rule A is dynamically efficient if there exists a price rule p such 
that (A, p) maximizes the total expected surplus: 
Notice that dynamic efficiency is a property of trading rules, and thus is independent of 
the choice of p. 
· 
Dynamic efficiency and Pareto efficiency coincide if ex-ante transfers of the divisible 
good can be made among the buyers, and among the sellers . Without such transfers, 
dynamic efficiency as we have defined it is utilitarian. To see the differences in this 
setting, consider a situation where some sellers are forced to trade with any buyer they 
meet in the first period whose valuation falls below a certain level, even if the buyer's 
value is less than the seller's. Such trades can be part of a Pareto efficient allocation 
if there are no transfers possible, since these sellers are taking low valued buyers out of 
the market. This benefits the other sellers since the remaining pool of buyers has higher 
average valuations. This is clearly inefficient if transfers can be made among the sellers. 
Also , notice that the defini.tion of efficiency takes the set of agents in the system as 
given. One cannot tell agents to leave without trading. If one admits the ability to 
control the agents in the system, then a stronger notion of efficiency emerges where one 
could tell all the agents other than the ones who trade in the competitive allocations 
not to take part in the matching at all . The efficient allocation under such a definition 
would coincide with the competitive one. One could implement such a rule by making 
the competitive price the only one available , so that indeed the 'inefficient' agents would 
have no incentive to take part in the matching. One has to take our model of agents' 
valuations as a simplification of a more complicated model where the value to each 
. agent of an agreement to trade depends on the specific pair of matched agents, and 
our reservation values are just expected values over a more complicated function. For 
instance, sellers with high expected valuations could still have some small probability 
that they would meet someone with whom they would have substantial gains from trade. 
Rather than complicate the model in this way to make it more realistic, we will work 
with the simpler model and take as given the presence of the agents. 
Negotiation and Game Forms 
The formal, or informal, negotiation process which goes on between a matched buyer 
and seller is represented by an extensive game form. We restrict attention to finite stage 
extensive game forms of perfect information. (The results extend to infinite stage game 
forms, but finite ones are all that are needed. ) The same extensive form is played by 
each matched pair. The procedure can depend on the time, and thus on the measures of 
agents remaining. However ,  the procedure cannot depend on the specific history of any 
measure 0 set of agents. 
1 1  
This last assumption is important. If one permits full contingency of the mechanism 
on the history, the implementation problem can become trivial. The future stages of the 
mechanism could then be chosen to enforce no trade if any agent deviates from prespec­
ified actions. This would defeat the idea of individual rationality as capturing voluntary 
trade with an endogenous outside option, as the outside option could be controlled as a 
function of any single agent's actions. 
One can argue that we should use the stronger assumption that the mechanism be 
the same in each period. That is, the form of negotiation available at any time should -
be the same if it is representing some primitive set of available actions. While we agree 
with this in certain contexts (for instance in a richer model where there were inflows of 
agents too) , allowing for the larger set of mechanisms will strengthen our impossibility 
results. 
Individual Rationality 
The heart of our analysis is the assumption that no agreement becomes binding until 
it is signed by each of the two agents. After negotiations have led to a suggested trade 
and price, the trade does not take place unless both agents "sign" the agreement. This 
is captured as follows. Consider, lti an extensive game form with perfect recall to be 
played between an arbitrary buyer and seller at some time t, such that each terminal 
node suggests either a trade and price, or no trade. Given It, let us define a dynamic 
version, r(lt), as follows. First, replace any terminal node of It which recommends a 
trade and price, with a node that has a binary choice node (yes, no) for the buyer. Let 
"no" lead to a terminal node with no trade as the outcome. Let "yes" lead to a binary 
choice node (Yes,  No) for the seller . Let "No" lead to a terminal node with no trade as 
the outc9me, and "Yes" lead to a terminal node with the originally prescribed trade and 
price. We have simply augmented It by additional moves which require both the buyer 
and seller's "signature" before completing the trade. 
Now at any time t ,  each matched buyer and seller play tlie augmented version of It· 
If the outcome of r( It) is trade, then the trade is consumated and the buyer and seller 
are removed from the matching process. If the outcome is no trade, then the buyer and 
seller are returned to their respective pools to be rematched in the next period. 
Equilibrium 
We can now define an equilibrium. Consider a specification of a pure behavioral 
strategy for each agent for each f(tt) as a function of the agent's own value and role 
(i.e. , . buyer or seller) as well as the value of the other agent he is matched with. We 
restrict attention to strategies that are measurable across agents' valuations. Such a 
collection of strategies induces an allocation rule (A, p). 
An equilibrium of the augmented sequence of mechanisms is a specification of strate-
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gies (as defined above) where for each t and pair of agents' values: 
(i) the strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of f('Yt) , given the anticipated 
values of the no-trade option under the induced allocation rule (A,p),8 and 
(ii) at any node where an agent's actions may lead either to current trade at some 
price or to rematching, the agent chooses an action leading to rematching only if it offers 
an expected utility higher than any of the other available actions. 
Part (i) of the definition of equilibrium imposes sequential rationality in the form of 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Part (ii) of the definition of equilibrium is a tie-breaking 
rule when an agent is indifferent between trading today or waiting an being rematched. 
The particular form of the tie-breaking rule is not important: we could have defined it 
to have agents always favoring delay in such situations. One can think of this as being 
equivalent to a lexicographic preference assumption that eliminates indifference. 9 This 
simplifies the analysis, as we will have a unique prediction of an outcome of a given 
extensive game form as a function of agent's reservation prices. As we shall see, however, 
the implementation problem is still non-trivial, as reservation prices are endogenous. 
Voluntary Implementation 
An allocation rule (A, p) is voluntarily attainable if there exist ( ')'1, . . . , IT) such that 
at least one equilibrium of the augmented sequence of mechanisms results in an allocation 
rule that is equivalent to (A,p) . 
The essential difference between attainability and implementability is uniqueness. At­
_tainability does not require uniqueness, and hence is a very weak form of implementation, 
roughly equivalent to what has been known in the literature as 'truthful' implementation 
(Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1979) . However, in this setting there is no revelation 
principle and we do not employ direct mechanisms, so we have defined attainability di­
rectly. More generally, one may be interested in knowing all the equilibria of a mechanism, 
which motivates the definition below. 
An allocation rule (A, p) is voluntarily implemented if there exist (11 , . . .  , IT) such 
that each equilibrium of the augmented sequence of mechanisms results in an allocation 
rule that is equivalent to (A,p) . 
8We could have simply referred to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game form with the 
continuum of players and T periods. In doing so we would have to specify what information was known 
to agents concerning matches and other players' behavior at each point in time. In order for subgame 
perfection to have any bite in a specific match and time, extreme informational assumptions would be 
necessary to avoid information sets (such as knowing the previous behavior of all agents and the full 
outcome of the matching) . The definition we employ applies subgame perfection directly to each time 
and match and thus avoids such assumptions. 
9We did not model it that way since it would preclude a utility representation. 
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More generally, we may simply be concerned that an efficient trading rule be imple­
mented (or attainable) and not concerned with the particular prices that are realized. 
We say that a trading rule A is voluntarily implemented if there exists a sequence "It such 
that for each equilibrium there exists a price rule p such that the equilibrium results in 
an allocation rule equivalent to (A,p). A trading rule A is voluntarily attainable if there 
exists a sequence "It such that there exists some equilibrium and price rule p such that 
the equilibrium results in an allocation rule equivalent to (A,p) . 
4 Dynamic Efficiency 
Homogeneous Sellers 
We begin with the case where the distribution over seller values has a simple form. 
In particular, they either have a reservation value of 0 or 1 . Thus, S1 (v) = S1 (0) for all 
v < 1 . We call this the case of homogenous sellers since all the sellers with whom trade 
is ever efficient have s = 0. Notice that this is essentially equivalent to having 'fewer' 
sellers than buyers, as being matched with a seller who has s = 1 is the same as not 
being matched at all. 
Example 1. 
Let T = 2 so that there are two periods of matching and potential trade, and consider 
the case where t5 = 1 . Buyers' valuations are uniformly distributed across [0,1] with a 
total mass of 1 .  A mass 0 < m < 1 of sellers have valuation 0 and the remaining mass, 
1 - m, have valuation 1 .  This is represented by B1 (b) = b for all b and S1 (s) = m for all 
s < 1 . 
If there were a centralized market , or one had control over the matching procedure, 
then all Pareto efficient allocations would involve the assets going to the buyers with 
value at least 1 - m. The competitive allocations are an obvious choice, where sellers sell 
to the buyers with values above the competitive price, p = 1 - m. 
In our model, trade is constrained through the matching process, and the character­
ization of an efficient allocation becomes more complicated. Some of the higher value 
buyers might never be matched to a seller with whom they can trade, and it is sometimes 
better to clear a trade with a low-valued buyer than to wait for a buyer with a higher 
expected value. 
Let us describe the dynamically efficient allocation rule for this example. It is clear 
that in the second (last) period, all positive value trades should be cleared, since there will 
be no further matching. It is also clear that a dynamically efficient trading rule will be a 
cutoff rule. It suffices to specify the minimum value of a buyer that a 0 value seller should 
trade with.  (These and other claims in this example are proved in Theorem 1 .) For any 
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value c set as a cutoff today, the remaining distribution tomorrow will be B2(b) = b for 
v :::; c, and B2(b) = (1 - m) (b - c) + c for b > c. The gain from clearing a trade today 
with a buyer of value b, is simply b .  Sellers who do not trade today are rematched in the 
second period. The expected value of the buyer that they will trade with in the second 
period is simply the expected value of b under the distribution B2(v) /B2(1 ) which is 
1 - m(l - c) ( l + c) 
2(1 - m(l + c) 
We can find a dynamically efficient trading rule by setting the cutoff value equal to the 
expected value of rematching. That is, on the margin, a trade should be cleared today 
if (and only if) it offers at least as much total value as could be expected by waiting 
and clearing the trade tomorrow. Thus efficient trading rules are characterized by any 
C* satisfying, 
or 
1 - m(l - C*) (l + C*) C* = --------2(1 - m(l + C*)) 
y'l - m - (1 - m) C* = . m 
The cutoff rule is decreasing in m. As the mass of sellers m increases, the current 
cutoff has less of a reduction effect on tomorrow's expected trading value. Also notice 
that the cutoff value is always lower than the competitive price ( 1 -m) , which makes sense 
since some of the competitive trades can never occur because of the matching process. 
Dynamic Efficiency with Homogenous Sellers and No Discounting. 
We first offer a characterization of dynamic efficiency for the case where sellers have 
either values of 0 or 1 ,  and where b = 1 .  As we shall see later, these assumptions offer 
considerable simplifications . All proofs are relegated to the appendix. 
Theorem 1 Suppose that b = 1 and S1(v) = 51(0) for all v < 1. There exists a unique 
(up to sets of measure 0) dynamically efficient trading rule. It can be represented by a 
cutoff rule, with associated functions ,81 , . . .  ,Br. The cutoff rules are the unique (up to 
sets of measure 0) solutions to the following equations : 
and 
,Bt(l ) = 1 Vt 
,Br(O) = 0 
(1 dB t+1 (b) ,Bt (O) = lo max[b, ,Bt+1 (0)] B t+i (l) 
for each t < T, where Bt+l is defined recursively by (2) . 
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(3) 
Notice that one cannot simply calculate f3t (O) by evaluating the right hand side of (3) , 
as Bt+l depends on f3t (O) . This means that (3) is a characterization of the efficient rule 
rather than a formula for it. It offers intuitive insight into the efficient solution, stating 
that it is the fixed point of a certain relationship. (Once one has specified a specific initial 
distribution, one can use (3) to obtain a closed form for the cutoff rule, as illustrated in 
the previous example.) The uniqueness of the solution to (3) in the above theorem is 
thus very important. 
Given the characterization of efficiency in (3) , we can deduce certain properties of 
efficient rules. 
Corollary 1 {i) The sequence of cutoff values is strictly decreasing: f31 (0) > · · · > 
fJr(O) . 
{ii) The static {centralized) competitive price is larger than (31 (0) . 
Analogous results hold for the case of homogeneous buyers and heteregeneous sellers. 
When there is discounting, the results extend in a natural way, but the argument used 
in proving Theorem 1 becomes messy. So, for the rest of the paper we restrict attention 
to two periods, T = 2 .  
Dynamic Efficiency with Heterogeneous Sellers and/ or Discounting: 
We now offer a characterization of dynamic effiency for more general distributions of 
sellers' values, with discounting and T = 2. 
Theorem 2 There exists a unique (up to sets of measure 0) dynamically efficient trading 
_rule. It is a described by cutoff rules, with associated functions f31(s) and f32 (s) . These 
cutoff valUes uniquely satisfy the following equations : 
/32 ( s) = s Vs E [ 0, l ] 
and 
(4) 
if this is feasible with /31 ( s) < 1, and (31 ( s) = 1 otherwise; where 52 and B2 are determined 
by (1) and (2), respectively. Furthermore, /31(s) is continuous and is strictly increasing 
at values of s such that (31 ( s ) < 1. 
Let us examine the intuition behind (4) as a characterization of efficiency. Consider a 
planner deciding on whether to clear a currently matched pair. Let these be the ones on 
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the left hand side. If this trade is cleared, then the left hand side represents the marginal 
value of consummating that trade today. If this trade is not cleared, then the right hand 
side gives the marginal expected value from throwing both players back in the pool to 
be rematched tomorrow. The first two expressions are the discounted expected values of 
the trades that these agents will have from being rematched in the next period. The last 
expression accounts for the fact that rematching these two agents uses up two agents from 
the next period. Thus, in addition to counting the expected value from the trades from 
rematching these two agents next period, we also have to subtract the expected value of 
the one match equivalent that is displaced due to the rematching. This is precisely the 
calculation in ( 4). 
In the special case where the sellers have reserve value of either s or 1 (the homogenous 
case) , (4) reduces to 
[ 1 
I dB2(b') /31 (s) - s = 8 lo max[b - s, O] B2(l) , 
which is simply a generalization of (3) to include discounting. 
5 Necessary Conditions for Voluntary Implementa­
tion and Attainability 
Next, we turn to the issue of voluntary implementation, and consider the case of arbitrary 
(finite) T. A characterization of voluntary implementation will provide us with the 
complete collection of allocation rules which could ever be the unique equilibrium outcome 
of such a dynamic interaction - under any negotiation process (which is representable by a 
finite extensive game form of perfect information). With such a characterization in hand, 
we will return to check whether it is compatible with the characterization of dynamic 
·efficiency. 
Given the individual rationality that is at the heart of our definition of voluntary 
implementation, it is clear that the trades suggested under an implementable (or attain­
able) allocation rule must be individually rational. By individually rational, it means 
that the price p of any trade consummated between s and b in period t must lie between 
the corresponding seller and buyer reservation values. 
Individual Rationality An allocation rule (A , p) satisfies individual rationality if for 
any t and almost every ( s ,  b) E At 
pf(s;A,p) �Pt (s, b) � �(b;A, p) ,  
A second necessary condition for voluntary implementation (or attainability) is indi­
vidual irrationality, which states that there is no price which is traded at by some pair 
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of agents at time t which is simultaneously individually rational for a pair of agents who 
do not trade. 
Individual Irrationality An allocation rule (A, p) satisfies individual irrationality if for 
each t, ( s' , b') ¢:. At and ( s, b) E At: either 
Pt(s , b) > p�(b'; A, p) 
or 
Pt(s , b)) < p:(s'; A, p) . 
A third condition that is necessary for voluntary implementation (or attainability) is 
that prices be non-decreasing in reservation prices. 
Non-decreasing Prices An allocation rule (A, p) has non-decreasing prices as a function 
of reservation prices, if for each t, ( s , b) and ( s' , b') in At: 
Pt (s , b) 2: Pt (s' , b') 
whenever pl(s; A, p) 2: JJt (s'; A, p) and p�(b; A, p) 2: p�(b'; A, p) . 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky ( 1991) state a related necessary condition for implementa­
tion without the possibility of rematching. Here we must state the condition in terms of 
reservation prices rather than agents' valuations, as reservation prices reflect the relevant 
valuations in the dynamic context . This distinction is important since reservation prices 
may not 'always be non-decreasing in an agent 's value, as reservation prices depend on 
future prospects for trade under an allocation rule. 
Notice that an implication of the above condition is that the price rule can only vary 
with the reservation prices of the agents. 
Theorem 3 Consider a trading rule, A ,  that is voluntarily attainab le (or implementab le), 
and (A, p), an allocation rule corresponding to one of the equilibria of an implementing 
mechanism, where A is equivalent to A. Then (A, p) satisfies individual rationality, in­
dividual irrationality, and non-decreasing prices. 
Let us make two remarks on Theorem 3 .  First, these conditions are necessary simply 
when one considers attainability. In other words, these conditions are needed simply to 
ensure that (A,p) can arise as an equilibrium of any mechanism. The conditions are 
not arising from multiple equilibrium considerations. Second, these conditions are also 
necessary when one admits infinite stage mechanisms. Details on this are given in a 
footnote to the proof. 
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These conditions play a central role in the full characterization. We defer the full 
characterization of dynamic implementation to Section 7. The full characterization tack­
les difficulties associated with possible discontinuities in the implemented price function, 
as well as the usual implementation challenge of ruling out equilibria which do not result 
in an allocation rule equivalent to (A, p) . For now, let us show that these conditions are 
also sufficient in some cases of interest. 
Theorem 4 Suppose that B1 and 81 are continuous and increasing. Consider an allo ­
cation rule, (A, p),  such that At is a continuous cutoff rule, 1 0 and Pt is continuous on At 
for all t .  (A, p)  is voluntarily attainable if and only if it satisfies individual rationality, 
individual irrationality, and has non-decreasing prices. 
6 Implementing Efficient Rules 
For the case with homogenous sellers and no discounting, the voluntary implementation of 
the dynamically efficient trading rule problem is easily handled. The characterization of 
dynamic efficiency from Theorem 1 has one comparing the value of a match today with the 
expected value of buyers' values tomorrow. This exactly matches the sellers' individual 
rationality constraint if the seller sees all of the gains from trade. The dynamically 
efficient trading rule is voluntarily implemented by the mechanism which has sellers 
making take it or leave it offers in each period. (A proof of this claim appears in the 
appendix. ) 
When there are heterogeneous sellers, however, implementing the dynamically effi­
cient trading rule becomes more difficult . In particular there is a rich set of individual 
rationality and individual irrationality conditions to be satisfied simultaneously. The fol­
lowing proposition establishes that this can be impossible, even with very well behaved 
initial distributions of buyers and sellers. 
Proposition 1 There exists a rich set of continuous and increasing distributions of buyer 
and seller valuatiOns for which the dynamically efficient trading rule is not voluntarily 
attainable (and hence not voluntarily implementable). 
The formal proof of Proposition 1 appears in the appendix. It shows, by means of 
a robust example, that it is not generally possible to assure individual rationality and 
individual irrationality are simultaneously satisfied.11 
The intuition is the following. When a buyer and seller trade in the first period, 
this creates (at the margin) an externality on the other traders, in that the trade has 
a marginal effect on the distribution of traders who are rematched in the next period, 
10The cutoff values from both the buyer and seller's perspectives are continuous functions. 
11 In fact, the only nontrivial example we have where the dynamically efficient allocation is voluntarily 
attainable is in the case of homogenous sellers. 
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which affects the expected gains from period two trade for the other pairs who do not 
trade in the first period. This is reflected in the last term of equation ( 4) . Thus in 
the optimal solution, it is possible that some "good" trading pairs should be left in the 
market to offset this externailty. This can be true even though the expected surplus from 
that transaction in the first period exceeds the sum of the expected surpluses of the two 
transacting parties were they to search one more period. If this is the case, then for any 
game that tries to implement the efficient solution, some of these trading pairs end up 
being tempted to trade in the first period, which will prevent the efficient solution from 
being an equilibrium outcome. 
7 The Characterization of Voluntary Implementa­
tion 
We now offer a complete characterization of voluntarily implementable allocation rules. 
Given P C [O, 1] , denote 
IR(P) = { ( q, r) E [0 , 1] 2  I 3p E P q � p � r} .  
An allocation rule (A,p) satisfies condition * if for each t there exists Pt C [O ,  1] and 
P t : [O, 1] 2 -t Pt such that: 
(*i) [Reservation Price Measurability] for every s, b E A t, P t (s, b) = P t (Pt (s),pHb)) 
(*ii) [Individual Rationality] (pf(s),p�(b)) E IR(Pt ), for every s, b E A t, and ps < 
Pt (Ps,pb) � pb, for every (p8,pb) E IR(Pt ), 
(*iii) [Individual Irrationality] (pf(s),p�(b)) rf. IR(Pt ), for every s, b rf. At 
(*iv) [Non-Decreasing Prices] P t is non-decreasing over the domain IR(Pt ), 
(*v) [Separating Prices] for every Cr/ , pb ) E IR( Pt ) and p8 such that (p8, pb) E IR( P t ), 
if Pt (P81, pb) < P t (P8, pb) then there exists p E P1 such that ps' � p < ps. Similarly, for 
every pb' if P t (P8,pb') > P t (p8,pb) then there exists p E Pt such that pb' 2:: p > pb. 
Let us discuss some of the differences in the above condition from the conditions 
stated in Section 4. The conditions stated in Section 4 are weaker versions of the above, 
but are still strong enough to reach the negative results in Section 5 .  
The conditions (*ii)-(*iv) are more complicated than the statements appearing in 
Section 4. The set Pt corresponds to the set of prices that are reachable by the imple­
menting mechanism. Sometimes it is necessary for this to be larger than the set of prices 
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which are supposed to be traded at in equilibrium, as off equilibrium behavior will be 
important in determining equilibrium behavior. (See the example below.) Then, for in­
stance, the individual irrationality condition must be satisfied relative to all of the prices 
in Pt. If some price in Pt is individually rational, then an equilibrium which results in 
trade will exist . So (*iii) must hold relative to all of Pt . 
Condition (*i) is new relative to what we presented in Section 4. The function Pt 
has as domain reservation prices, as these are what matter in determining equilibrium 
actions. It is necessary then that the implemented price function be measurable with 
respect to reservation prices, which is condition (*i) . 
The last condition (*v) is also new relative to what we presented in Section 4. It 
states that the implemented price function can only be increasing in places where we can 
distinguish the reservation prices of the agent in question. If for instance fl' < ps , but 
there are no prices from Pt in between ps' and ps, then these two types would have exactly 
the same preferences over trades in Pt (the only ones possible from the implementing 
mechanism) . In such a case, the equilibrium actions of these two types would be the 
same. 
Condition * is necessary for implementation (and attainability) . 
Theorem 5 If an al location rule (A, p) is voluntari ly imp lementab le (or simp ly attain­
ab le), then there exis ts (A, p) which is equivalent to (A, p) and satisfies condition *. 
Let us now turn to the full implementation problem. First let us consider an exam­
ple that illustrates the above condition, and shows that there is a multiple equilibrium 
problem. 
Example 2 Consider the dynamically efficient trading rule defined in Example 1 ,  when 
m = 1/2 .  
· 
Consider a fixed price of c = � - 1 in the first period, which corresponds to C* . So 0 
valued sellers trade with all buyers with values above c in the first period at a price of c. 
In the second period let 0 valued sellers trade with all buyers, and trade at a price equal 
to the buyer's valuation. 
Let us check that condition * is satisfied relative to this A, p. Let P1 = { c} and 
P2 = [O ,  l ] .  Let j)i ("ps , pb) = c and ih (ps , pb) = pb . It is then simple to verify (i)-(v) . 
Thus, we should be able to find a mechanism which has A, p as an equilibrium. 
Consider the following mechanism. The first period is the degenerate mechanism that 
simply has trade at price c. The second period is a mechanism where a seller makes take 
it or leave it offers to the buyer, where the seller can name any price in [0, 1 ] . 
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Let us check that there is an equilibrium that results in (A, p) . It is the obvious one. 
Buyers approve trade in the first period if and only if b ;:::: c, and the 0-valued sellers 
approve trade in the first period. Notice that from the characterization of dynamic 
efficiency (and from Example 1 ), we know that a 0-valued seller's reservation price is 
exactly c in the first period.  In the second period ,  0 valued sellers make the offer of b to 
the buyer they are matched with, and it is approved. 
But there is another equilibrium relative to the above mechanism! It involves all of 
the sellers rejecting the first period price. The second period is as before. This is an 
equilibrium, since if all the sellers reject in the first period, then the full mass of buyers 
is still there in the second period. The average value of the buyers is then 1/2 in the 
second period. Since this is larger than c (see Example 1 ), the sellers are indeed acting 
optimally. 
There are two equilibria of this mechanism. If sellers believe that 0-valued sellers will 
all trade in the first period when matched with buyers who have values above c, then they 
are willing to do so, since they expect only a value of c in the second period. However ,  
if  sellers believe that a significant (mass > 0) portion of the 0-valued sellers will not be 
trading in the first period when matched with buyers who have values above c ,  then they 
realize that the expected value tomorrow will be above c, and so they will wait too. 
In fact, the efficient equilibrium is fragile: even a small variation in the expectations 
makes it better for the seller to wait . 
However, the efficient allocation rule is fully implementable. We simply have to alter 
the above mechanism. Consider the following change: In the first period the buyer makes 
a take it or leave it offer to the seller from the set of prices [c, 1] . Any buyer with a value 
above c would always rather trade in the first period, since they expect to have their full 
".alue extracted in the second period. High valued buyers can offer sellers enough to get 
them to trade in the first period, even if the sellers expect a value above c in the second 
period. This means that the trades will occur in the first period that should. Given that 
they occur, the buyers will. be able to offer c and get it . 
The mechanism needs to have a possible range of prices in the first period that is 
larger than just c in order to implement the efficient rule. This illustrates the role 
of Pt in condition * ·  It also gives us insight to the full characterization. When we 
consider this P1 = [c, 1] , condition * is not satisfied relative to the undesired allocation 
rule where all of the agents wait until the second period to trade. In particular, (iii) , 
individual irrationality is violated in this example. We are now ready to state the full 
characterization. 
We restrict attention to implementation via mechanisms for which there exists · a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the augmented mechanism for each t relative to every set 
of reservation prices fl , pb . 
Notice that first, just by definition of implementation, there must exist a subgame 
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perfect equilibrium of the augmented mechanism for each t relative to the reservation 
prices ps , pb which are generated by the implemented allocation rule. 
So why should we care about existence relative to reservation prices ps , pb which could 
only be generated by other allocation rules? The reason is that otherwise one could handle 
the multiple equilibrium problem by simply having subgame perfect equilibrium not exist 
for some agents relative to the expectations generated by some undesired allocation rules. 
This would be problematic because in the absence of existence we would not have a well 
defined prediction of behavior. In such cases it would be hard to say that · we have 
ruled out undesired behavior, for the agents could still act in ways consistent with the 
undesired allocation rules . In contrast, if there does exist subgame perfect equilibrium 
relative to the expectations, and it does not correspond to the allocation rule, then we 
can say that we do have a prediction of how agents will play, and it does not correspond 
to the undesired allocation rule. 
Theorem 6 If an allocation rule (A, p) is voluntarily implementable by a mechanism 
satisfying the above existence requirement then 
( 1 )  there exists (A, p) which is equivalent to (A, p) and satisfies condition *, and 
(2) for each (A', p') not equivalent to (A, p), (A', p') fails to satisfy condition * relative 
to the same p and Pt as (A, p) .  
Conversely, if (1 ) and (2) hold and Pt is closed for each t then (A, p) is voluntarily 
implementable by a mechanism satisfying the above existence requirement. 
We know that it is not necessary that Pt be closed. It is an open question whether 
. ( 1 )  and (2) are sufficient in the absence of this condition, or whether there are additional 
necessary conditions. 
The implementing mechanism is quite simple. It involves a sequential announcement 
of both reservation values by both agents. The mechanism 'Yt at time t is described as 
follows: 
Stage 1.  The seller announces ps . proceed to stage 2 . 
Stage 2 .  The buyer announces ps' ,  pb . Proceed to stage 3 .  
Stage 3 .  The seller announces pb' . 
The Outcome: 
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If pb1 � pb and p81 � p8 and (p81 , p01) E IR(Pt), then the outcome is Pt(ps1, pb1) ;  
If pb1 < pb and ps1 < ps and (ps1, pb) E IR( Pt) ,  then the outcome is inf {p E Pt IP � ps1} .  
If pb1 > pb and (p8 , pb1) E IR(Pt) , then the outcome is sup{p E Pt lP � pb1} .  
Otherwise, the outcome is no-trade. 
In the above mechanism, the announcement of ps' allows the buyer to challenge the 
seller's announcement if, for instance, the seller announces ps > ps . The announcement 
of pb' by the seller serves a similar purpose. If the seller honestly reveals ps , then a buyer 
has no incentive to challenge. 
8 Concluding Remarks 
There are three main contributions in this paper. 
First, we provided a characterization of dynamic efficiency in a setting with random 
matching and search. In situations where markets are truly decentralized, standard 
notions of efficiency are inappropriate since goods may not be transferable from one 
arbitrary agent to another. The matching process imposes constraints on the set of 
feasible allocations, and introduces search externalities across agents. The constraints 
and externalities are at the heart of the characterization of dynamic efficiency. 
Second, we obtain a clean characterization of implementation in situations where 
mechanisms cannot impose trade on agents. The characterization is intuitive in terms 
of the individual rationality conditions which naturally arise from the voluntary choice 
of agents to accept the outcome of the mechanism, or reject it and search for a new 
trading partner in the next period. The implementation can be achieved by simple 
mechanisms using_ alternating move games with perfect information, with a structure 
similar to standard bargaining games. 
Third, we show that it is often the case that dynamically efficient allocations are 
inconsistent with voluntary decentralized trade under any bargaining game. Even with 
atomless agents, the externalities cannot be overcome, regardless of the mechanism by 
which agents negotiate and trade. Thus, in spite of the fact that trading pairs share com­
plete information about each others ' valuations , the strong necessary conditions imposed 
by voluntary trade are incompatible with overcoming the externalities and achieving 
efficient allocations. 
The strength of the first two12 results we obtain is, of course, tempered by the fact 
that we have worked in a specific setting. The specific nature of the preferences of the 
12The last result (inefficiency) naturally still holds in more general settings. 
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agents (i .e . ,  the "bargaining" structure) , the way in which agents may accept or reject 
the suggestion of the mechanism, and the particular matching technology are important 
in terms of the clean and intuitive characterizations we obtain. 
Relative to the implementation literature, this suggests exploring how the nonim­
position restriction behaves in more general environments, especially those where one 
admits the possibility of some choices in matching, such as those offered by a centralized 
exchange. Relative to the competitive bargaining problem, it would be interesting to 
examine how the analysis extends an infinite horizon, and to situations where there are 
inflows of agents. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1 :  Consider time T with distributions of buyers and sellers, BT 
and ST. It is clear that any trade between a buyer with 0 < b < 1 and a seller with s =  0 
should be cleared, but with s = 1 should not be cleared. Thus, AT can be represented 
as a cutoff rule. It is also clear that this is unique up to sets of measure 0. 
We now proceed by induction. Suppose that given t ,  (Ai , . . .  , At) ,  and (B1 . . .  , Bt) ,  
the conclusions of the proposition hold fo r  each 7 > t .  That is, for each 7 > t, 
(An . . .  , AT) , are uniquely determined (up to sets of measure 0) cutoff rules satisfy­
ing (3) , where B7+i (v) is determined by (2) . We show that this implies the same is true 
for t .  
Since A is  dynamically efficient, it  follows that for any price rule, p, the allocation rule 
(At , . . .  , Ar , Pt , . . .  , PT) maximizes the T - t  horizon problem with initial distributions St 
and Bt : 
W(At , . . .  , Ar, Pt , . . .  , PT) = 
fs ut (s , At , . . .  , Ar i Pt , . . .  , pT)dSt (s) + fb u�(b, At , . . .  , Ar i  Pt , . . .  , pr )dBt(b) . 
As the above expression is independent of the choice of the price functions, consider the 
prices given by ift(s, b) = b. Then Jb u�(b; A, p)dBt (b) = 0, so the above expression reduces 
to 
W(At , . . .  , Ar) =  
ut (O, At ,  . . .  , AT ; Pt , . . .  , PT )St (O) + ut (l , At , . . .  , AT i Pt , . . .  , pr )St (l ) 
Now given the induction, we can write 
W(Ati . . .  ' AT) = 
St(O) fb:(o,b)EAt bd:/cW + St (l) fb:(l ,b)EAt (b - 1 ) d�cW + St+1 (0) J01 max{b, f3t+i }  �B1cW 
Let us rewrite this as 
ll ' (7r1 ,  · · · ,  7fT ) = 
St (O) fl 1rt (O, s )b�1c\�) + S1 ( 1 )  J01 7f1 ( 1 ,  s ) (b - 1 )  d:cw + �:+�m f01 max{b, f3t+1 }dBt+1 (b) 
where (7r1 , . . .  , 7rT) is a collection of functions 7r1 ( s , b) = 1 if (s, b) E At and 7rt (s , b) = 0 if 
( s, b) tJ_ At . 
We can maximize W(7r) with respect to all measurable ?r's and show that the unique 
solution is a bang-bang function and that it corresponds to the claimed cutoff function 
in Theorem 1 .  We employ the Maximum Principle. 
First let us consider 7r(O, b) . Differentiating W(7r) with respect to 7r(O , b) provides 
d[W(7r)] 
- bdB (b) St
(O) d(St+1 (0)/Bt+1 (1 ) ) [1 [ f3 ]dB ( )  St+1 (0) dG d[7rt (O, b)] t Bt (l) + d7rt (O, b) lo 
max v ,  t+l t+l v +Bt+ 1 ( 1 ) d7rt (O, b) ' 
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where 
G = fo
1 
max[v , ,Bt+1] dBt+1 ( v) 
Notice that (1 ) and (2) are equivalent to: 
1 ( [1 dBt(b) ) St+1 (v) = St(v) - s::;v lo 1rt (s, b) Bt(l) dSt(s) 
Therefore 
so 
( dSt(O) ) dBt+i (v) = 1 - 7rt (O , v) St (l ) dBt(v) . 
dSt+1 (0) = -dBt(b) 
St (O) 
d7rt (O, b) Bt(l) ' 
dBt+1 ( v) 
_ -dBt(b) 
St (O) 
d7rt (O, b) 
-
Bt(l) ' 
for any v 2: b and 0 otherwise. And 
d(dBt+1 (v) )  
_ -dBt(b) 
St (O) 
d7rt (O, b) - Bt(l) ' 
if v = b and 0 otherwise. 
Thus, 
and 
d(St+1 (0)/Bt+i (l) ) = -dBt (b) St (O) (Bt+1 ( l ) - St+1 (0) ) d7rt (O, b) Bt(l) (Bt+i (1) )2 
dG St (O) 
d7r(O, b) 
= -max [b, ,Bt+iJdBt(b) Bt (l ) , 
Substituting these above expressions back into tr�b7t]1 gives 
d[lilf(7r)] 
d[7rt(O , b)] 
dB (b) St ( 0) (b - ( Bt+ 1 ( 1 )  - st+ 1 ( 0) )  r 1 [ ,B J dBt+ 1 ( v) - [b ,B l st+ 1 ( 0) ) t Bt (l) Bt+1 (l) lo max v, t+l Bt+1 (l ) max ' t+l Bt+1 ( 1 ) 
In order for this to equal 0 ,  it must be  that (3) holds. (Notice that it is impossible to  set 
the expression equal to 0 with b < f3t+1 , so max[b, f3t+i] = b. ) Furthermore, as b increases, 
this expression gets larger, which implies that the solution is a cutoff rule and there is 
a unique b for which the right hand side equals 0 (except for the set of measure 0 b 's 
for which dBt(b) = 0 which are irrelevant in the expected utility) . Performing the same 
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exercise with respect to s = 1 ,  provides ir��l�t�J < 0 for all b < 1 which implies that the 
optimal cutoff for s = 1 equals 1 . 1 
Proof of Corollary 1 :  
(i) The proof i s  inductive. From above, f3r = 0 and f3r-1 = 8 fl max{b, f3r} �(W = 
8 fl b d�(W . By construction and by the assumptions that 8 > 0 and dB1 ( b) > 0 \lb E [ 0, 1] , 
8 fl b�tcW ?' 0, so f3r-1 > 0 = f3T· Hence the statement is true for T - 1. The induction 
hypothesis 1s that f3s > f3s+i for all s =  t, t + 1, . . .  , T. Then for : 
since f3t > f3t+i 2:: 0. Since Bt+l is obtained from Bt by removing mass from the distri­
bution of buyers with valuations above f3t, it follows that�+i_1cW :::; �cW for all b 2:: f3t, 
so by first order stochastic dominance 
Thus, f3t-1 > f3t · 
(ii) Notice that from the characterization in Theorem 1 it follows that 
u� (O) = fo
1 
max{b, (31 }dB1 (b) . 
Suppose that to the contrary of (ii) , (31 (0) 2:: pc where pc = B11 (1 - S1 (0) ) is the static 
(centralized) competitive price. Then 
But 
Thus 
uf (O) > f1 bdB1 (b) . }pc 
Notice that this second expression is the total welfare that one could get from a problem 
where one was not constrained by matching. That is, the total welfare from the static 
(centralized) problem. This is a contradiction since the total welfare (the value of the 
objective function) in the constrained problem cannot exceed the total welfare in the 
unconstrained problem. I 
Proof of Theorem 2:  First, it is clear that an efficient trading rule should have cutoff 
rules for second period trades with {32 (s) = s, so A2 = { (s , b) : b > s} .  
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Assuming the form for (32 , and using f5t (s , b) = b (as in the proof of Theorem 1 ) ,  we 
can write 
W(A1 , A2 ) = 
It (JbEAi(s) (b - s)dB1 (b)) dS1 (s) + 8 IrJ f81 (b - s)�2<WdS2 (s) 
where A1 (s) = {b : (s , b) E Ai}, and B2 and 82 are determined by (1) and (2) . 
Let us rewrite this as 
W(7r, A2) = 
J01 (!01 7r(b, s ) (b - s )dB1 (b)) dS1 (s) + 8 ft f81 (b - s) �2<W dS2 (s ) ,  
where 7r(s , b) = 1 if (s , b) E A1 and 7r(s , b) = 0 if (s , b) � A1 .  
As in the proof of Theorem 1 ,  we can maximize W(7r) with respect to all measurable 
?r 's and show that the unique solution corresponds to the cutoff function given by ( 4) . 
Recall that 
and 
S2 (v) = S1 (v) - 1�v 
(fo
1
7r(s, b)dB1 (b)) dS1 (s) 
B2 (v) = B1 (v) - 1�v 
(fo
1 
7r(s , b)dS1 (s)) dB1 (b) . 
Differentiate W(7r) with respect to 7r(s, b) for any (s , b) , which leads to: 
Next, observe that 
d[dS2 (s)] 
d[7r(s , b)] = -dB1 (b)dS1 (s) , 
d[dB2 (b)] 
d[7r(s , b)] 
= -dB1 (b)dS1 (s) , 
and 
d[B2 ( l ) ] 
d[7r(s , b)] = -dB1 (b)dS1 (s) . 
Substituting these expressions into (Al) provides 
d[liF(7r)] 
d[7r(s , b)] = dB1 (b)dS1 (s) 
[(b _ s) + 8 [
1 (11 (b' _ s) dB2 (b')) dS2 (s') _ 8 1\b _ s) dB2 (b') _ 8 fb(b _ s') dS2 (s')] · lo s' B2 (l) B2 ( l ) s B2 (l) lo B2 (1 ) 
29 
. h h d[W('rr)] 0 d 0 h d[W(7r)] '] The solution should ave 7r = 1 w en d[7r(s,b)J > an 7r = w en dr7r(s,b)J < 0 .  o see 
that the solution should be a cutoff rule, fix s and notice that the part mside the brackets 
on the right hand side of the expression for �f�l;�J is increasing in b. Setting �f�l;�J = 0 
implies (4) . I 
We next present the proofs of theorems 3-6. We do this in the order: Theorem 6, 
Theorem 5, Theorem 3,  Theorem 4. This is different from the order in the body of the 
paper, but it is the natural order _to present the proofs, since the more general results.in 
Theorem 6 are used to prove Theorem 5 , and ultimately Theorems ' 3  and 4. The claim 
in Section 6 and Proposition 1 are proved at the end. 
Proof of Theorem 6 :  
We begin by demonstrating the necessity of the conditions. Suppose that (A, p) is 
implemented by ( 11 , . . .  , '/'T ) . Let Pt be the set of prices that correspond to some terminal 
node of 'l't· 
Lemma: For any t, and for any ( s ,  b) pair, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome of r( '!'t) satisfying (ii) in the definition of equilibrium, as a function of (p8 , pb) . 
It is trade at some price if and only if (p8 , pb) E IR( Pt) .  
By part (ii) of the definition of equilibrium, an agent's choice from a set of outcomes 
is uniquely determined. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can be found by 
backward induction, which results in a unique outcome. 
Only If: By the veto power that each agent has under the augmented mechanism, 
the unique equilibrium outcome must be no trade if (p8 , pb) � IR(Pt ) ·  
If: We now show that if (p8 , pb) E IR(Pt ) ,  then the unique equilibrium outcome 
must be trade at some price. Suppose the contrary, so that for some (p8 , pb) E IR(Pt) , 
the equilibrium 01.�tcome is no trade. Consider a pair of equilibrium strategies for (p8 , pb) 
when they are matched at time t and denote these (]" .  These lead to no trade at time t .  
Consider also some strategies which lead to the outcome of p at time t and denote these 
(]"
1
• Alter (]" at each node on the play path of (]"1 to match the action under (]"1 at that 
node, and leave the actions at other nodes under (]" unchanged. Call this new strategy 
(]"
11 • Since (]"11 results in trade at p, it must not be an equilibrium for p8 and pb . 13 Find 
the last node along the play path of (]"11 such that there is an improving deviation for the 
agent choosing at that node. Find a best response for that agent at that node.14 The 
new play path must lead to trade at some price since it is improving for the agent and 
both agents weakly prefer p to no trade. The new strategy combination is now a Nash 
13Notice that infinite stage mechanisms can be admitted and this proof still works, since er' (and thus 
er" ) must result in trade after some finite number of stages. 
14We know that there exists a best response at that node, since the other actions at that node yield 
the same outcomes that they would under er, and there is a best response there under er .  
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equilibrium in all subgames from this node on (and all subgames off the current play 
path) . Iterate this logic up the nodes of the play path. This results in a subgame perfect 
equilibrium which has an outcome of trade at some price, which is a contradiction. I 
With the lemma in hand, we can conclude the proof of necessity in the theorem. 
Define Pt to be the equilibrium price of r("yt) as a function of (ps ' f}). By the lemma, 
this is a well defined function on the domain IR(Pt) · 
Let (A, p) denote an allocation rule corresponding to some equilibrium. By the def­
inition of implementability, it is equivalent to (A, p). Define Pt relative the equilibrium 
strategies leading to (A, p) . 
We first verify (1) . We show that condition * holds relative to (A, p) ,  for the Pt and 
Ft defined above. 
(*i) and (*iii) follow directly from the lemma. 
(*ii) follows from the lemma and the fact that agents will never accept a price that 
is not individually rational in an equilibrium of the augmented mechanism. 
(*iv) Given the uniqueness from the lemma above, this follows directly from the proof 
of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1991) [Appendix II of the working paper version] . 
(*v) By (*iv) we know that ps1 < ps Suppose the contrary of (*v) . Then for all p E Pt , 
either p 2: ps and p 2: ps1, or p < ps and p < ps1 •  This implies that the set of equilibria 
is exactly the same for the two agents when either is matched with pb . This implies 
nonuniqueness of the equilibrium outcome, a contradiction. 
Next, let us verify (2) .  
Consider an ( A1, p1) which is not equivalent to (A, p) . Consider the Pt and Pt defined 
for each t as above. Notice that (*iv) and (*v) are satisfied, as they are independent of 
the allocation rule. We must show that one of (*i) , (*ii) , and (*iii) fail for (A1, p1) relative 
to the Pt and Pt defined above. 
By the lemma, for each t and (s, b) there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome of r('"Yt) relative to the reservation values (pt(s; A1, p1), p�(b; A1, p1)) .  Select a 
subgame perfect equilibrium pair of strategies for each t and (s, b) . By the implementation 
of (A, p), these strategies cannot result in (A', p1) . Thus, there exists t and (s ,  b) such 
that either 
Case 1: (s, b) tf. A� and the outcome is trade at some price p, or 
Case 2: ( s, b) E A� and the outcome is trade at some price p =/= p1 ( s, b) , or 
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Case 3 :  (s, b) E A� and the outcome is no trade. 
In case 1 , it follows from lemma that (p: (s; A1, p1) , p�(b; A1 , p1)) E IR(Pt) ,  which me.ans 
that (*iii) fails. 
In case 2, it follows from the definition of Pt that p�(s, b) =f. Pt(P: (s; A1, p') , � (b; A1 , p1)) ,  
which means that (*i) fails . 
In case 3 ,  it follows from lemma that (p: (s; A1 , p1) , p� (b; A1 , p1)) ¢:. IR(Pt) , which means 
that (*ii) fails. 
We now prove sufficiency. Assume that (1) and (2) hold. Consider the implementing 
mechanism, ( 71 , . . .  , "/T) ,  described above. The remainder of the proof consists of verify­
ing three claims. 
Claim 1: Consider t and a subgame perfect equilibrium of the augmented version of 
the mechanism described above under part (ii) of the definition of equilibrium, when 
reservation values are (p8 , pb) .  The outcome is unique, and: 
(a) if (ps , pb) E IR(Pt ) then the outcome is trade at Pt(Ps , pb) .  
(b) if (ps , pb) ¢:. IR( Pt) then the outcome is no trade. 
Proof of Claim 1: The set of possible outcomes from the above mechanism is Pt . 
Thus (b) follows by the same logic as lemma, noting that in this case a subgame perfect 
equilibrium exists because no price is ever approved by both agents. Similarly, if (ps , pb) E 
IR(Pt) then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is trade at some price, 
provided an equilibrium exists. We need to show that a subgame perfect equilibrium 
. exists and it is trade at fit(pb , ps) . 
Consider the following strategies which result in fit(pb , ps) . It is easily checked that 
given these expectations, these form a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
On the equilibrium path behavior: The seller announces ps = ps . The buyer an­
nounces (ps1 ,  pb) = (ps , pb ) . The seller announces pb' = pb . Both approve this. 
Off the equilibrium path behavior: 
Each player approves any price that is indivdually rational for them, and vetos others. 
If the seller announces p8 < p8 , then the buyer announces (ps1 , pb) = (ps , pb) .  
If the seller announces p8 > ps , then the buyer announces (ps1 ,  pb) = (ps , pb) .  
If the buyer announces pb < pb , then the seller announces pb' = pb. 
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To see that this is an equilibrium, notice first that if the seller announces a price in 
excess of his reservation price, the buyer can correct the announcement and win all the 
surplus, and (by (*5)) end up paying a lower price. If the seller announces a price below 
his reservation price, he is directly conceding some surplus to the buyer. If the seller tells 
the truth, then the buyer cannot claim the seller has a lower reservation price, or this 
will lead to no trade. Similarly, the buyer cannot gain from understating his reservation 
price, since the seller could then correct this announcement to the true buyer reservation 
value, and win all the surplus. 
Claim 2 :  There exists an equilibrium which results in At , Pt · 
Proof of Claim 2 :  If we fix the reservation prices of the buyers and sellers, then there is 
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any matched pair for a specific stage. 
So fix the reservation prices at those generated by the allocation rule, At , Pt · We will 
verify that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this case results in At , fft. 
If (s ,  b) ¢:. At , then no trade is the only subgame perfect outcome of the augmented 
mechanism. This follows from (*iii) and Claim 1 .  
If (s , b) E At , then from Claim 1 and (*i) and (*ii) it follows that the outcome is trade 
at Pt(P: (s ;  A, p) , � (b; A, p)) . 
Claim 3 :  If (A' , p') not equivalent to (A, p) , then (A', p') is not the result of any equi­
librium of the mechanism. 
Proof of Claim 3: Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium that results in 
(A', p') . . .  
Consider (s, b) ¢:. A� . It must be that the outcome of f('yt) is no trade. LFrom Claim · 
1 , it then follows that (*iii) of condition * holds relative to Pt and Pt. 
Consider (s, brE A� . It must be that the outcome of r(1t) is trade at pHs, b) . It then 
follows from Claim 1 that (*i) and (*ii) of condition * hold relative to Pt and Pt . 
This contradicts (2) ,  which implies that (A' , p') fails to satisfy (*i) , (*ii) , or (*iii) 
relative to Pt and Pt . I 
Proof of Theorem 5 :  This is the same as the above proof of the necessity of (1 ), except 
that lemma is only stated for (ps , pb) relative to which equilibrium exists. Then one needs 
to extend Pt to satisfy (*ii) , (*iv) , and (*v) , for (ps , pb) E IR(Pt) relative to which there 
does not exist an equilibrium. For such a (ps , pb) , define Pt(Ps , pb) by setting it equal to 
the max of ps and the sup of Pt over (ps', pb') E IR(Pt) such that ps' ::=:; ps , pb' ::=:; pb, and 
for which there exists an equilibrium. This construction clearly satisfies (*ii) , (*iv) , and 
(*v) . I 
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Proof of Theorem 3: This follows directly from Theorem 5. 1 
Proof of Theorem 4: It follows from Theorem 6 that the conditions are necessary. To 
see that they are sufficient we show that condition ( * )  of Theorem 6 is satisfied relative 
to (A, p) . Then the result follows from Claims 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 6 .  
Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, reservation prices are continuous and non­
decreasing functions of s and b. Given the continuity of p and A it follows that individual 
rationality must hold with exact equality for cutoff pairs.15 Thus, if b = f3t( s) (where 
f3t is the cutoff defined by the cutoff rule At) ,  then Pt (b) = Pt (s) = Pt(s ,  b) . To see this, 
consider a cutoff pair s, b. By individual rationality Pt(b) 2: Pt(s , b) 2: Pt (b) . For any 
b' < b we know that either Pt(b) < Pt(s, b) or Pt(s) > Pt(s ,  b) . We know that the second 
cannot hold, so it must be that Pt(b) < Pt(s, b) . Then by continuity, Pt (b) = Pt(s ,  b) . 
Similar reasoning establishes Pt (s) = Pt(s, b) . 
Let g_t be the min{s J (s ,  b) E At for some b} , and g_t be the max{s i (s , b) E At for some 
b} .  Similarly define b.t and I/ . Next, notice that Pt(g_t) = Pt(b.t ) = Pt(g_t , Q_t) and similarly, 
plst) = JJt CF/) = Pt (st , I/) .  Given the assumptions on At and Pt, the range of Pt over pairs 
in At is [1Jt (§..t , Q_t) , pt (8t , bt) ] ,  since (l, b.t) E At and (st , b
t
) E At given that At is a cutoff 
rule and cutoffs are non-decreasing in value. 
So, let Pt = [Pt (l, b.t) , pt (st , b
t
) ] . For p8 , pb E IR(Pt) define Pt(P8 , pb) through Pt(s , b) 
by setting 
Pt(]/ , Pb) = Pt( s' , b') 
where s' = min {s Jp: (s) 2: max{p8 , pf (g_t) }}  and b' = max {b Jp: (b) 2: min{pb , pHbt) } } . 
Using this, we verify that condition ( *)  is satisfied relative to (A, p ) .  ( *i) holds since if 
s ,  b E At , then s' = s and b' = b in our definition above. (*ii) holds by the construction 
of Pt and the individual rationality assumed in Theorem 4. (*iii) holds by the individual 
irrationality assumed in Theorem 4 .  (*iv) holds by the construction of Pt · To see (*v ) ,  
notice that for jft(p81 , pb) < ift(p8 , f}) ,  it must be that min {s Jp: (s) 2: max{p81 , p: (g_t) } }  
< min {s Jp: (s) 2: 'max{p8 , pf (g_t)} } .  Thus, from the definition of p, there exists s'  < s 
and b with Pt(P81 , pb) = Pt (s' , b) and p1(p8 , pb) = Pt (s, b) . Given the individual rationality 
in Theorem 4, we know that (s'b) E A1 and (sb) E At . By continuity of p, we can find 
s", b E At with Pt(s', b) < p1 (s", b) < p1 (s ,  b) .  Then (*v) is satisfied with p = Pt(s" ,  b) . 
The same can be done for the other part of the condition concerning buyer values .  I 
At the beginning of Section 6 we made the following claim which we now prove. 
Claim: Given homogenous sellers and no discounting) the dynamically efficient trading 
rule is voluntarily implemented by the mechanism which has sellers making take it or 
leave it offers in each period. 
15Given the continuity, all claims that were "almost every," no longer have that qualifier. 
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Proof: First , we show that the dynamically efficient solution is the outcome of an 
equilibrium of the augmented mechanism. Second, we show that the any equilibrium of 
the augmented mechanism results in the dynamically efficient solution. 
The following strategies form an equilibrium resulting in the efficient solution: Buyers 
accept any offer at any time that is no more than their valuation. At any time t with 
some remaining buyer distribution Bt, a seller with s =  0 matched with a buyer who has 
a reservation value b at time t, makes the offer b if b 2 f3t, and 1 otherwise, where f3t is the 
dynamically efficient solution. Sellers with s = 1 always offer 1 . Both approve any trade 
at a price at least as high as their reservation prices under the continuation. To see that 
this is a subgame perfect equilibrium of r( "ft) (given the expectations of the continuation) 
notice that buyers' choices are best responses, since they will never see an offer lower than 
their b. Now let us consider sellers ' choices. The choices of a seller with s = 1 are obvious, 
so consider a seller with s = 0. Given that they make an offer that they want accepted, 
it is a best response to set the offer at b. Thus we need to verify that their best response 
is to trade with b (at a price of b) if only if b 2 f3t· Since f3r = 0 in the last period, this 
is clear. Given the analysis of the last period, we know that in the second to last period ,  
sellers either trade with the buyer to whom they are matched, or wait and see an expected 
value of f01 v dBr/ Br(l) . Thus, a seller in the second to last period is better off trading 
today if and only if b 2 f01 v dBr(v)/Br(l) = f3T-l · By induction, a seller is better off 
trading today if and only if b 2 f3t = JJ1+1 v dBt+i (v)/Bt+1 (l ) + f3t+iBt+i (/3t+1 )/Bt+i (l ) . 
Now let us verify that any equilibrium must result in the dynamically efficient solution.  
We proceed by analyzing the last period first . Any subgame perfect equilibrium in 
the last period must have sellers with s =  0 making offers equal to the buyers' values and 
then buyers accepting in the last period. This follows from a standard argument: In a 
subgame perfect equilibrium, buyers must accept any offer which is less than their value 
and reject any offer higher than their value in the last period. Thus, it cannot be an 
·equilibrium for the seller to offer the buyer less than their value, since the seller could do 
better by .raising the offer slightly. Similarly, it cannot be an equilibrium for the seller to 
offer the buyer at a price higher than the buyer's value, since she could gain by making 
an offer below the buyer's value. Thus, the only possible equilibrium offer must be at 
the buyer's value. For this to be an equilibrium the buyer must accept . 
Given the analysis of the last period, buyers must expect no surplus in the last period ,  
and so any trade that occurs in equilibrium in the second to last period must occur at 
the buyer's value b. By induction ,  the price on any trade in any period must occur at 
b. Now let us examine seller's choices. By the same argument as previously given on 
sellers' incentives, sellers with s = 0 should trade with a buyer of value b in the second 
to last .period if and only if b 2 Jd v dBr(v)/Br( l ) ,  where Br is the distribution induced 
under the equilibrium. This follows the unique efficient solution starting at time T - 1 
with Br_1 .  By induction , sellers with s = 0 should trade with a buyer of value b in 
period t if and only if b 2 /31 = JJ1+1 v dBt+1 (v)/Bt+i (l ) + /3t+1Bt+1 (/3t+1 )/Bt+1 (1 ) ,  where 
Bt+l (and Bt) are the distributions induced under the equilibrium. Given the uniqueness 
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of the efficient solution at any time, it follows that the equilibrium must result in the 
dynamically efficient solution from time 1 .  I 
Proof of Proposition 1 :  Consider 0 < E < 1/2 and initial distributions of buyers and 
sellers represented by 
B1 (0) = Hl - E) , 
B1 (b) = ! (1 - E) + b 1:_E for 0 < b < 1 - E, and 
B1 (b) = ! (1 + E) + b-(!-E) ! (l  - E) , for 1 - E :::; b, and 
S1 (s) = H� - 1) ,  for s :::; E 
S1 (s) = . 5 (1 - E) + �::::: E for E < s < 1 ,  and 
These distributions have mass .5(1 - E) of sellers who have values uniformly distributed 
over (0 ,  E) , then mass E with values uniformly distributed over (E , 1 ) ,  and the remaining 
mass of . 5 ( 1  - E) with value 1 .  Buyers are symmetric to this so that there is a mass 
. 5 ( 1  - E) of buyers who have values uniformly distributed over ( 1  - E, 1 ) ,  then mass E 
with values uniformly distributed over (0, 1 - E) , and the remaining mass of . 5 ( 1 - E) with 
values = 0 .  
From Theorem 2, the cutoff rule for the efficient allocation satisfies 
As E becomes small, the period 2 distribution of buyers and sellers is almost all on values 
near 0 and 1 .  This means that E2(b) converges to ( 1-B2 ( .5) )/  B2 (1 ) ,  E2 (max[,B1 (0) - s, O] ) 
converges to ,81 (0)82 ( . 5)/82 ( 1 )  and E2 (max[b-s, O] ) converges to ( 1-B2 ( .5 ) )S2 ( .5)/ (S2 (1 )  
B2 ( 1 ) ) .  So as E becomes small, 
Solving for ,81 (0) 
/31 (0) = (1 - B2( .5 ) ) /B2 (1 ) .  
This means that ,81 (0) is at most 1/2 ,  since none of the b = l 's are cleared in the first 
period .  So B2 ( .5) = 1/2 and B2 ( 1 )  = 3/4. Thus, ,81 (0) converges to 1/3 as E goes to 
zero. Similarly, 0"1 (1)  converges to 2/3 as E goes to zero. Also note that ,81 is continuous 
as b increases above 0, and similarly for 0"1 • 
We now show that the necessary conditions for voluntary attainability cannot be 
satsified. Suppose to the contrary that they are. Pick some small I > 0,  and apply 
individual irrationality to b' = ,81 (0) - I and s' = 0 .  Since we know that individual 
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rationality is satisfied for s close to 0 and some b close to ,81 (0) , it follows that that for 
almost every r 16 
We also know that 
To see this notice that there is a probability of at most ���·;}
.
that the buyer is matched 
with someone with a value between 'Y and .5 ,  and the best price they can get is then 
p2 ( r, ,81 ( 0) - r)) .  For 'Y small enough, there is at most 2E chance that they are matched 
with a seller with value smaller than 'Y· 
Thus, from the two inequalities above, 
A similar argument for s' = 'Y and b' = ,81 (0) leads to 
Given the symmetry of the distributions and thus the efficient solution, ���·N 
1��(�)5) . So summing the two previous inequalities we find that 
Simplifying 
We can follow the same arguments for around the buyer with value 1 and the cutoff 
seller a 1 ( 1) to find that 
16We will proceed as if this satisfied for s = 0 and b = f:h (0), while this can be redefined to be some 
agents arbitrarily close to these . 
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Summing (1) and (k) we find 
82 (.5) 82 (.5) (!h (O) + 1 - a1 (l) - 41) (1 - 82(l) ) 
< 82(l )  (p2 ('Y
, l - 1) - p2 (1, /h (O) - 1) 
+P2(a1 (l) + 1, 1 - I) - P2 (/, 1 - 1) )  + 8E (m) 
(m) simplifies to 
82 (.5) 82 ( .5) 
. . 
(,81 (0) + 1 - a1 (l)  - 41) (1 - 82(l) ) 
< 82(l) (P2 (a1 (l) + 1, l - 1) - p2 ('Y, ,81 (0) - 1))  + 8
E 
As E and I go to zero, this approaches 
or approximately 
This is impossible to satisfy. 
The example is robust in that the above argument will hold for all initial distributions 
that are close to the above ones since the resulting efficient allocation rules would be close 
by, as would the reservation prices. I 
The intuition behind the proof is as follows: In the second period, there will be close to 
a population with proportion 1/3 high value buyers, 2/3 "dummy" buyers, and similarly 
1/3 low value sellers, 2/3 "dummy" sellers. This means that any agent has a chance 
.of only 1 /3 of meeting a good match tomorrow. Somebody must get no more than 1/2 
of the surplus from tomorrow. This means that either the low valued seller or the high 
valued buyer has an expected value of no more than 1/6 from trading tomorrow. Say 
it is the low valued seller . From Theorem 3 (from which the combination of individual 
rationality and individual irrationality almost imply that individual rationality is exactly 
binding for ,81 (0) ) , this implies that the low valued seller can get no more than 1/6 from 
her cutoff trade today. Since the cutoff is approximately 1/3, the buyer with value 1/3 
must get at least 1/6 from the trade today. However this buyer can expect at most 
1/3(1/3) from waiting and is thus more than happy with the trade today. Then some 
other buyer with a lower value, but close to 1/3 ,  who should not trade will also turn out 
to be happy to trade, contradicting individual irrationality. 
38 
References 
[1] Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1992) , "Virtual Implementation in Iterative Undom­
inated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, 60, pp. 993-1008. 
[2] Al-Najjar, N. ( 1996) , "Aggregation and the Law of Large Numbers in Economies 
with a Continuum of Agents," mimeo: Northwestern University. 
[3] Baliga, S . ,  L .  Corchon, and T. Sjostrom (1995) , "The Theory of Implementat�on 
When the Planner is a Player" mimeo: Harvard University 
[4] Baliga, S .  and T.  Sjostrom (1995) , "Interactive Implementation" mimeo: Harvard 
University 
[5] Brusco, S .  and M. Jackson (1996) ,  "The Optimal Design' of Security Markets," 
mimeo: Northwestern University. 
[6] Butters, G .  (1980) , "Equilibrium Price Distributions in a Random Meetings Mar­
ket ," mimeo: Princeton University 
[7] Chakravorti, B . ,  L. Corchon, and S .  Wilkie (1992) "Credible Implementation," forth­
coming in Games and Economic Behavior. 
[8] Diamond, P. ( 1982) "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium" 
Review of Economic Studies, 49, pp. 217-27 
[9] Dutta, B . ,  A. Sen and R. Vohra (1995) ,  "Nash Implementation Through Elementary 
Mechanisms in Economic Environments," Economic Design, 1 ,  pp. 173-204. 
[10] Feldman, M. and C. Gilles (1985) ,  "An Expository Note on Individual Risk without 
Aggregate Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, 35, pp. 26-32. 
[11] Gale, D. (1986a) , "Bargaining and Competition Part I :  Characterization," Econo­
metrica, 54, pp. 785-806. 
[12] Gale, D. (1986b) , "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence,"  Econometrica, 
54, pp. 807-818. 
[13] Herrero, M.  and S .  Srivastava ( 1992) , "Implementation via Backward Induction," 
Journal of Economic Theory, 56, pp. 70-88. 
[14] Jackson, M. (1992) , "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A look at 
Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, 59, pp. 757-775 . 
[15] Jackson M. ,  T. Palfrey, and S. Srivastava (1994) , "Undominated Nash Implementa­
tion in Bounded Mechanisms" Games and Economic Behavior, 6,  pp. 474-501 . 
[16] Judd, K. (1985) , "The Law of Large Numbers with a Continuum of I .I .D. Random 
Variables," Journal of Economic Theory, 35, pp. 19-25.  
39 
[17] Kalai, E. and J .  Ledyard (1995 ) ,  "Repeated Implementation." 
[18] Lu, X. and P. McAfee (1995) , "Matching and Expectations in a Market with Het­
erogeneous Agents," in Advances in Applied Microeconomics, M. Baye, Conneticut: 
JAI Press. 
[19] Ma, C . ,  J. Moore, and S. Turnbull ( 1988) , "Stopping Agents from 'Cheating'" Jour­
nal of Economic Theory, 46, pp. 355-72. 
[20] Maskin, E. and J .  Moore (1987) , "Implementation with Renegotiation," mimeo: 
Harvard University. 
[21] McLennan, A.  and H.  Sonnenschein (1991 ) ,  "Sequential Bargaining as a Noncoop­
erative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibria," Econometrica, 59, pp. 1395-1424. 
[22] Mortensen, D.  (1982) , "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining 
Game," J .  J .  McCall The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
[23] Peters, M. (1987) "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States," 
Econometrica, 59, pp. 1424-1444. 
[24] Postlewaite, A .  and D .  Wettstein (1989) "Continuous and Feasible Implementation" 
Review of Economic Studies,56, pp. 14-33. 
[25] Rubinstein, A .  and A. Wolinsky ( 1985) ,  "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential 
Bargaining," Econometrica, 53, pp. 1133-1150. 
[26] Rubinstein, A.  and A.  Wolinsky ( 1992) , "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and 
Time Preferences," American Economic Review, pp. 600-614. 
· [27] Saijo T . ,  Y. ,Tatimitani, and T.  Yamato (1993 ) ,  "Toward Natural Implementation," 
forthcoming in International Economic Review. 
[28] Shimer, D: and L. Smith (1996) "Assortative Matching and Search" in progress: 
MIT. 
[29] Sjostrom, T.  (1995) "Implementation by Demand Mechanisms," Economic Design 
1 ,  pp. 343-354. 
[30] Stahl, I ( 1972) Bargaining Theory, Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics. 
40 
